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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/564,805	05/17/2006	Marie-Cristine Secretin	112701-701	3416
<sup>29157</sup> K&L Gates LLl	7590 11/19/200 <b>P</b>	EXAMINER		
P.O. Box 1135 CHICAGO, IL	60600	SMITH, PRESTON		
CITICAGO, IL	00090		ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			1794	
			NOTIFICATION DATE	DELIVERY MODE
			11/19/2009	ELECTRONIC

## Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

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chicago.patents@klgates.com

## Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief

Application No.	Applicant(s)		
10/564,805	SECRETIN, MARIE-CRISTINE		
Examiner	Art Unit		
PRESTON SMITH	1794		

	PRESTON SMITH	1794	
The MAILING DATE of this communication appe	ars on the cover sheet with the	correspondence add	ress
THE REPLY FILED <u>09 November 2009</u> FAILS TO PLACE THIS		-	
1. The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or on application, applicant must timely file one of the following application in condition for allowance; (2) a Notice of Apperfor Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance with 37 C periods:	the same day as filing a Notice of replies: (1) an amendment, affidavi eal (with appeal fee) in compliance	Appeal. To avoid abar it, or other evidence, w with 37 CFR 41.31; or	hich places the (3) a Request
a) The period for reply expires <u>5</u> months from the mailing date	of the final rejection.		
b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this A no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire la Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(the content of the co	dvisory Action, or (2) the date set forth ater than SIX MONTHS from the mailin b). ONLY CHECK BOX (b) WHEN THE	g date of the final rejection	n.
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date of have been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extunder 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b). NOTICE OF APPEAL	ension and the corresponding amount hortened statutory period for reply origi than three months after the mailing da	of the fee. The appropria inally set in the final Office	ate extension fee e action; or (2) as
<ol> <li>The Notice of Appeal was filed on A brief in comp filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any exter Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed with AMENDMENTS</li> </ol>	nsion thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to	avoid dismissal of the	
3. The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, be	out prior to the date of filing a brief	will not be entered be	cause
(a) ☐ They raise new issues that would require further cor	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		cause
(b) They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE below		, ,	
(c) They are not deemed to place the application in bet appeal; and/or		ducing or simplifying th	ne issues for
(d) ☐ They present additional claims without canceling a c	corresponding number of finally reje	ected claims.	
NOTE: (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)).			
<ol> <li>The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.12</li> <li>Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s):</li> </ol>		mpliant Amendment (I	PTOL-324).
6. Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be all non-allowable claim(s).		timely filed amendmer	nt canceling the
7.  For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a) how the new or amended claims would be rejected is prove The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows:		ll be entered and an ex	xplanation of
Claim(s) allowed: Claim(s) objected to:			
Claim(s) rejected: <u>1 and 5-21</u> .			
Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration: AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE			
<ol> <li>The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, but because applicant failed to provide a showing of good and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e).</li> </ol>			
9. The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to o showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessary	vercome <u>all</u> rejections under appea	al and/or appellant fails	s to provide a
10.	n of the status of the claims after e	ntry is below or attache	ed.
<ol> <li>The request for reconsideration has been considered but See Continuation Sheet.</li> </ol>	does NOT place the application in	n condition for allowand	ce because:
12. ☐ Note the attached Information <i>Disclosure Statement</i> (s). ( 13. ☐ Other:	PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s)		
	/Drew E Becker/ Primary Examiner, Art U	Jnit 1794	

Continuation of 11. does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because: Applicant argues that Carlson does not teach or mention any percentages or the requirement of specific percentages of ARA and DHA in the total fatty acids in the lipid source as is required, in part by the present claims (see second paragraph of page 4). Carlson teaches a "formula" (infant, see column 3, line 47 and line 65) comprising protein, carbohydrates, and lipids (column 11, line 27). As seen in table IV (the table is based on the lipids), column 13, lines 5-31, arachidonic acid and docosahexaenoic acid may be present in 0.41 weight % (22 mg) and 0.14 weight % (7 mg) respectively (column 13, lines 36-41). Additionally, the amounts of arachidonic acid may range from 1.0-60 mg (column 3, lines 66-67) and the amounts of docosahexaenoic acid may range from 0.25-35 mg (column 4, line 1) in the formula. Although Carlson fails to explicitly teach arachidonic acid and docosahexaenoic acid both being present in the formula wherein the docosahexaenoic acid amount is 0.2-0.5%, Carlson does teach that the amount of docosahexaenoic acid may range from 0.25 - 35 mg as discussed previously (the 0.14% discussed previously pertains to 7 mg being present.) In light of these teachings, one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to slightly increase the docosahexaenoic acid content to 7 mg (which results in 0.14%) to a slightly higher amount in order to boost the brain health boosting properties (produce known effects) of the formula (see docosahexaenoic acid NPL). Also, in light of the teachings discussed previously, the claimed range would have been discoverable by routine experimentation by one of ordinary skill in the art seeking to boost the brain health enhancing properties of the "formula".

Applicant also argues that Carlson fails to teach promoting the immune system (see page 4, 2nd paragraph). The formula of the composite invention would "strengthen" the immune defenses and reduce morbidity in infants since it would it would reduce the risk of conditions such as necrotizing enterocolitis (an infant infection).

Applicant also argues that Halpin-Donhnalek and Kraty fail to remedy the deficiencies of Carlson (see page 4, 3rd paragraph). Halpin-Dohnalek teaches probiotics such as lactobacillus (column 3, lines 44-48. the formula may additionally comprise bifidobacterium also as seen in column 3, lines 35-36) for use in an infant formula (column 4, lines 23-25). Carlson doesn't teach probiotics and thus Halpin-Dohnalek was considered to remedy this lacking feature. Kratky teaches sweet whey proteins that have been modified by the removal of CGMP from the protein (column 2, lines 36-37). Carlson doesn't teach sweet whey proteins and thus Kratky was considered to remedy this lacking feature.

Applicant also argues that the references can not be combined to overcome the deficiencies of Carlson because each of the references is geared towards combating different problems (see pages 5, 2nd paragraph). In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Carlson was simply used to teach sweet whey protein.

Applicant also argues that Haplin-Dohnalek is drawn to treatment of older children(see page 5, 4th paragraph) however Haplin Dohnalek states that the invention can be used with infants (abstract). Applicant also argues that probiotics Lactobacillus reuteri and Lactobacillus acidophilus are not recommended by the WHO for consumption by children under the age of 3. The probiotics of Haplin Dohnalek can be used in a nutritionally complete infant formula and thus this argument is not sufficient to overcome the rejection (see abstract of Haplin-Dohnalek).

Applicant argues that Kankaanpaa (reference provided by applicant) teaches that one of ordinary skill would have been deterred from combining probiotics and PUFA's (see page 5, last paragraph). The Kankaanpa reference does not appear to establish that combining probiotics with PUFA's would be disadvantageous in the references cited by examiner.

In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually (see page 6, all of the arguments. The references were only used to teach concepts in the primary reference that were lacking), one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

In response to applicant's argument that the examiner's conclusion of obviousness is based upon improper hindsight reasoning (see page 7, 3rd paragraph), it must be recognized that any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning. But so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made, and does not include knowledge gleaned only from the applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971).

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